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COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL: THE EXTENT TO WICH
DECISIONS OF THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
APPEALS BOARD AND MUNICIPAL OR COUNTY
PENSION BOARDS BIND EACH OTHER
In recent years, California's Workmen's Compensation Act has
elicited voluminous commentary. One aspect, however, has received
comparatively little attention: The collateral estoppel effect of Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board1 decisions on the administration of
pension plans for employees of California municipal corporations and
counties.
The problem can be clarified by example. Suppose an employee
is covered by both workmen's compensation and a county or municipal
pension plan. Assume that recovery under the pension plan is predicated, as it is under workmen's compensation, upon a finding that the
employee suffered a service-incurred disability. If the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) determines whether the disability
is service-incurred or not, does collateral estoppel make this determination binding upon the pension board? Or, if the pension board is the
first to make this determination, must the WCAB respect its decision
under collateral estoppel?
It is not particularly surprising that the problem has not been
treated exhaustively by legal writers. California's work force exceeds
eight million; 2 yet only a small percentage of these-somewhat over
175,000-are covered by county or municipal pension plans.' Even so,
the matter deserves attention if for no other reason than its importance
to those employees, who are covered by more than 34 separate pension
systems.4 Considering the proliferation of government agencies, the
problem should become increasingly relevant in the future.
1. Prior to 1966, the body was known as the Industrial Accident Commission.
CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 53, 111, amended by Cal. Stats. 1965, ch. 1513, § 1, 6, 214 at

3555, 3556-57, 3608. Hereinafter, the Industrial Accident Commission will be referred
to as the IAC and the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board as the WCAB.
2. DOCUMENTS SECnON, STATE OF CALi ORNA, CALIFoRN A STATISTICAL ABsTRACr 19 (1968) [hereinafter cited as DOCUMENTS].
3.

See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS OF GoVERN-

mENTS, Vol. 6, No. 2, EMPLOYEE RETnMEmNT SYSTEMS OF STATE AND LOCAL Gov-

ERNMENTS 32-35 (1967). Since the statistics given deal only with pension systems
with over 200 members, the number of pension plans in existence exceeds the figures
given. Since teachers and judges are covered by different pension systems, they have
not been included in the foregoing statistics; nor will they be discussed in this article.
4. See DOCUMENTS, supra note 2.
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Judicial Character of the Workmen's Compensation
Appeals Board and Municipal and County
Employee Retirement Associations
By constitutional amendment, the WCAB is a court empowered
to receive evidence and pass judgment on all matters within its jurisdiction. 5 This jurisdiction is limited and exclusive: limited in that the
WCAB may not adjudicate matters beyond those enumerated in the
Workmen's Compensation Act;6 and exclusive because proceedings to
secure compensation under the Act "shall be instituted before the appeals board and not elsewhere .

.

.

."I

Moreover, the WCAB's ju-

dicial status is not diminished by its authority to proceed informally
and to adopt rules of evidence that are far less stringent than those
8
binding on other courts.
The judicial status of each municipal and county pension board is
less easily defined.
A municipality may lawfully confer quasi-judicial powers on
boards or commissions dealing solely with municipal affairs. This
power is acquired by municipalities under Article XI, section 8%,
subdivision 4 of the Constitution. This provision does not, however, automatically confer quasi-judicial power upon local boards.
A municipality must, by charter or ordinance, expressly or im5. CAL. CONST. art. 20, § 21 provides: "A complete system of workmen's compensation includes . . . full provision for vesting power, authority and jurisdiction in
an administrative body with all the requisite governmental functions to determine any
dispute or matter arising under such legislation, to the end that the administration of
such legislation shall accomplish substantial justice in all cases expeditiously, inexpensively, and without incumbrance of any character; all of which matters are expressly
declared to be the social public policy of this state, binding on all departments of the
State government." The IAC's status as a constitutional court was recognized in Pacific Coast Cas. Co. v. Pillsbury, 171 Cal. 319, 322, 153 P. 24, 26 (1915), and Solari
v. Atlas-Universal Serv., Inc., 215 Cal. App. 2d 587, 593, 30 Cal. Rptr. 407, 410 (1963).
6. Gerson v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 188 Cal. App. 2d 735, 738-39, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 4 (1961); 1 W.

HANNA,

CALIFORNIA LAW OF

EMPLOYEE

INJURIES

AND

WORK-

MEN'S COMPENSATION § 1.02[9], at 1-13 (2d ed. 1968).
7. CAL. LABOR CODE § 5300. CAL. LABOR CODE § 5301 provides: "The appeals board is vested with full power, authority and jurisdiction to try and determine
finally all the matters specified in Section 5300 subject only to the review by the court
as specified in this division."
The WCAB shares concurrent jurisdiction with the superior court over one matter
only. When an employee simultaneously seeks relief from the WCAB and files a tort
action against his employer in superior court, each tribunal shares concurrent jurisdiction
to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the subject matter. The tribunal first
assuming jurisdiction may restrain the other from proceeding until a final adjudication
of the issue has been made; such adjudication is then res judicata to the second tribunal.
Scott v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 46 Cal. 2d 76, 82-83, 293 P.2d 18, 22 (1956).
8.
CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 5708, 5709; see Bancroft, Some ProceduralAspects of
the California Workmen's Compensation Law, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 378, 386-90 (1952).
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pliedly confer such power upon the board or the power does not
exist. 9

In creating such power, it is unnecessary for the charter or ordinance to
make elaborate provisions with respect to hearings by the board. 10
Quasi-judicial status has been inferred from language in a charter that
simply provides that awards be made upon presentation of evidence to
the "satisfaction" of the board."The essential characteristic of the quasi-judicial body is its
fact finding power and the concomitant requirement to make a

determination or adjudication of fact 2in connection with matters
properly submitted to it after a hearing.'
Without this authority, the board is ministerial rather than quasi-judicial.' 3 Once a pension board has quasi-judicial status, though, its
findings, if based upon substantial evidence, are binding on courts in
4
the absence of capriciousness or fraud.'
When authorized by their charters or the legislature, counties may
also create quasi-judicial boards to govern their retirement systems. 15

It must be remembered that such pension plans are "municipal af9. Le Strange v. City of Berkeley, 210 Cal. App. 2d 313, 322, 26 Cal. Rptr. 550,
556 (1962). When a local ordinance states that it is in pursuance of a state retirement
statute, it incorporates that act in its entirety. Klench v. Pension Fund Comm'rs, 79
Cal. App. 171, 177, 249 P. 46, 47 (1926); cf. Cole v. City of Los Angeles, 180 Cal.
617, 182 P. 436 (1919) (incorporation of the Municipal Improvement District Act by
a city charter).
10. See Flaherty v. Board of Retirement, 198 Cal. App. 2d 397, 407, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 256, 263 (1961).
11. See id. at 407, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 263; Ware v. Retirement Bd., 65 Cal. App.
2d 781, 792, 151 P.2d 549, 554-55 (1944).
12. Le Strange v. City of Berkeley, 210 Cal. App. 2d 313, 323, 26 Cal. Rptr. 550,
556 (1962).
13. French v. Cook, 173 Cal. 126, 129, 160 P. 411 (1916); see Sheehan v. Police
Comm'rs, 197 Cal. 70, 74-75, 239 P. 844, 846 (1925).
14. See Ran v. Retirement Bd., 247 Cal. App. 2d 234, 237, 55 Cal. Rptr. 296,
298 (1966); Corcoran v. Retirement Bd., 114 Cal. App. 2d 738, 740-41, 251 P.2d
59, 60 (1952); Rogers v. Retirement Bd., 109 Cal. App .2d 751, 757, 241 P.2d 611, 615
(1952); Dornell v. Retirement Bd., 72 Cal. App. 2d 197, 198, 207, 164 P.2d 266,
267, 271 (1946); Ware v. Retirement Bd., 65 Cal. App. 2d 781, 788, 151 P.2d 549, 555
(1944); Brent v. Retirement Bd., 57 Cal. App. 2d 721, 722, 733-34, 135 P.2d 396,
397, 403 (1943).
15. For a discussion of the counties' constitutional authority, see Byers v. Board
of Supervisors, 262 Cal. App. 2d 148, 155, 68 Cal. Rptr. 549, 554 (1968). Powers
constitutionally granted to the counties are found in CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 1, 7,
7:-. Statutes authorizing counties to create retirement systems are: County Employees Retirement Law of 1937, CAL. Gov'T CODE H9 31450-898; County Peace Officers
Retirement Law, CAL. Gov'T CODE H9 31901-32063; County Fire Service Retirement
Law, CAL. GOV'T CODE H9 32200-365; County Peace Officers and Fire Service Retirement, Disability, and Death Pension Plan Law, CAL. GOV'T CODE H9 33000-017.
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fairs,"'" and cannot be state-wide in scope.'
Because of this, the
workmen's compensation provisions of the Labor Code prevail over
county or municipal ordinances in cases of conflict.'
The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel

9

The purpose of collateral estoppel (or "res judicata" as20 it is frequently called) was discussed in Bernhard v. Bank of America:
The doctrine of res judicata [collateral estoppel] precludes
parties or their privies from relitigating a cause of action that has
been finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. Any
issue necessarily decided in such litigation is conclusively determined as to the parties or their privies if it is involved in a subsequent lawsuit on a different cause of action. The rule is based
upon the sound public policy of limiting litigation by preventing a
party who has had one fair trial on an issue from again drawing
it into controversy. The doctrine also serves
to protect persons
2
from being twice vexed for the same cause. '
Justice Traynor then indicated what criteria must be satisfied for the
doctrine to apply:
In determining the validity of a plea of res judicata three
questions are pertinent: Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in ques16. Murphy v. Piedmont, 17 Cal. App. 2d 569, 571-72, 62 P.2d 614, 615, affd,
64 P.2d 399 (1936) (per curiam), Klench v. Pension Bd. Comm'rs, 79 Cal. App. 171,
179-80, 249 P. 46, 48 (1926).
17. In the absence of constitutional amendments such as that which authorized
the IAC, there is no constitutional authority to create state-wide, quasi-judicial bodies.
Doing so infringes upon CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 1, which vests all judicial power in the
courts. Cf. Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors, 13 Cal. 2d 75, 81, 87 P.2d 848,
852 (1939); Standard Oil Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 6 Cal. App. 2d 557, 563,
59 P.2d 119, 119-20 (1936); Ware v. Retirement Bd., 65 Cal. App. 2d 781, 792-93,
151 P.2d 549, 555 (1944).
This prohibition against establishment of quasi-judicial
bodies does not extend to chartered municipalities and counties, however. See Standard Oil Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra; Ware v. Retirement Bd., supra. Nor
has their power in this respect been curtailed by an amendment to article 6, section 1,
which removed the legislature's power to create inferior courts other than municipal
and justice courts. Savage v. Sox, 118 Cal. App. 2d 479, 485-88, 258 P.2d 80, 85

(1953).
18. Healy v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 41 Cal. 2d 118, 122, 258 P.2d 1, 3 (1953);
CAL. CONST. art. 11, § 11.
19. California courts tend to use the generic term "res judicata" quite loosely
when referring to what, more properly is collateral estoppel. Hence, when "res judicata" appears in a quotation in this text it is synonymous with collateral estoppel, as
opposed to the aspects of bar and merger. See, e.g., French v. Rishell, 40 Cal. 2d 477,
254 P.2d 26 (1953); Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 897, 810-11, 122 P.2d
892, 894 (1942).
20. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942); accord, Dow Chem. Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 67 Cal. 2d 483, 432 P.2d 365, 62 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1967); French
v. Rishell, 40 Cal. 2d 477, 254 P.2d 26 (1953).
21. 19 Cal. 2d at 810-11, 122 P.2d at 894 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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tion? Was there a final judgment on the merits? Was the party
a party or in privity with a party
againstwhom the plea is asserted
22
to the prior adjudication?
Collateral estoppel "presupposes concurrent and not exclusive jurisdiction" over the subject matter; 23 and if either tribunal lacks such
jurisdiction, the doctrine is inapplicable. Therefore, it is germane to
consider the extent to which the jurisdiction exercised by the WCAB
and by local pension boards is concurrent or mutually exclusive.
It has been argued that where an employee's recovery under both
workmen's compensation and a local pension plan is predicated upon
the presence of a service-connected disability, the WCAB has exclusive
jurisdiction to determine the extent and origin of that disability.
[W]here the [WCAB] has jurisdiction, the Pension Board has none,
other than as an administrative board which administers retirement
benefits in accordance with previously made determinations of the
[WCAB]. Where a disability is found to be service connected by
the [WCAB], then it is incumbent upon the Pension Board to ad24
minister a retirement pension in accordance with such a finding.
This contention is erroneous. Each tribunal is established "to attain
wholly independent objectives."2 5
Workmen's compensation benefits are predicated upon state policy
"that the unfortunate economic results caused by the injury or death
of an employee shall, in a measure, be borne by society."' 26 Both state
law 27 and the constitution 28 endow the WCAB with exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate such claims.
Pension plans serve a different function, which is "in harmony
rather than in conflict"2 with workmen's compensation. Such plans
are not intended to provide compensation for loss of future income,
per se; they represent an integral, anticipated portion of a municipal or
county employee's salary.30 A pension board must honor this obligation to employees who have become incapacitated. In addition, pension
22. Id. at 813, 122 P.2d at 895 (emphasis added).
23. Pathe v. City of Bakersfield, 255 Cal. App. 2d 409, 417, 63 Cal. Rptr.
220, 224 (1967).
24. Brief for Appellant at 10, Pathe v. City of Bakersfield, 255 Cal. App. 2d
409, 63 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1967).
25. 255 Cal. App. 2d at 414, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
26. Larson v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 71 Cal. App. 2d 60, 64, 162 P.2d 33, 35
(1945).
27. CAL. LABOR CODE § 5300.
28. See CAL. CONsT. art. 20, § 21.
29. 255 Cal. App. 2d at 416, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 224.
30. Larson v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 71 Cal. App. 2d 60, 63-64, 162 P.2d 33,
35 (1945); Sacramento v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 74 Cal. App. 386, 240 P. 792

(1925).
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boards bear a further responsibility: "To make certain that these employees will be replaced by more capable employees for the betterment
of the public service without undue hardship on the employees
removed."3 1
With this basic distinction between the function of the two
independent tribunals in mind, it is manifest that the jurisdiction
of the Industrial Accident Commission is exclusive only in relation
to its own objectives and purposes and at the very most overlaps
the subject matter jurisdiction of the pension board on a single
32
issue of fact only ....
In other words, each tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction except for a
small sliver of concurrent jurisdiction over one issue: whether a serviceconnected disability has been sustained.
WCAB Findings Are Binding on Local Pension Boards
Application of Collateral Estoppel: French v. Rishell
Prior to adjudication of the landmark case of French v. Rishel3 3
in 1953, it was by no means certain that collateral estoppel applied to
cases in which an injured employee was covered by both workmen's
compensation and a county or municipal pension system. Cases dealing with other situations arising under the Workmen's Compensation
Act acknowledged that the IAC could make final determinations of
fact;34 moreover, IAC findings were "required to be findings of ultimate fact. 3 5 Such findings were deemed res judicata in subsequent
proceedings between the same parties and their privies if the same facts
were to be adjudicated.3 6 But no appellate court had held that collateral
estoppel was operative when the subsequent proceedings were before a
pension board.
Indeed, Schmidt v. Pension Board37 held to the contrary-that
31. 255 Cal. App. 2d at 422, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
32. Id. at 415, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 223.
33. 40 Cal. 2d 477, 254 P.2d 26 (1953).
34. See Schaller v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 11 Cal. 2d 46, 50-51, 77 P.2d 836,
838-39 (1938); Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 407, 410-13, 156 P.
491, 493-94 (1916).
35. Ethel D. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 219 Cal. 699, 708, 28 P.2d 919, 923
(1934); accord, Argonaut Ins. Exch. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 49 Cal. 2d 706, 712,
321 P.2d 460, 464 (1958). CAL. LABOR CODE § 5953 provides: "The findings and conclusions of the appeals board on questions of fact are conclusive and final and are not
subject to review. Such questions of fact shall include ultimate facts and the findings
and conclusions of the appeals board ......
36. Goodman Bros. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. App. 2d 297, 301-03, 124 P.2d
644, 646-47 (1942); see Gerini v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 27 Cal. App. 2d 52,
54-55, 80 P.2d 499, 501 (1938).
37. 63 Cal. App. 2d 439, 147 P.2d 90 (1944), overruled, French v. Rishell,
40 Cal. 2d 477, 254 P.2d 25 (1953).
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prior determinations of fact by the IAC would not bind a municipal
pension board. In that case, a Bakersfield fireman succumbed to coronary occlusion while home in bed. The IAC predicated an award to
his widow on the finding that the attack arose out of and in the course
of the deceased's work. These findings were offered as evidence in a
hearing before the Bakersfield City Firemen's Pension Board, but pension benefits were denied on the ground that the death was not serviceconnected. 8 The appellate court held that IAC findings were not res
judicata in the pension board proceedings. If they were res judicata,
the court reasoned, pension boards would be deprived of authority to
administer their funds in the manner prescribed by the city charter. 9
In 1953 the California Supreme Court expressly disapproved
Schmidt in French v. Rishel.4 ° French, a captain in the Oakland Fire
Department, also died of coronary occlusion. Finding that death
"[piroximately resulted from an injury occurring in the course of and
arising out of his employment,"'" the IAC made an award to French's
widow. Subsequently the widow applied to the Firemen's Relief and
Pension Fund for benefits pursuant to section 104(1) of the city charter,
which stated that the board "[s]hall provide for the family of a member
of the Department who may die as a result of an injury or disability
incurred while in the performance of his duty. . . ."4 The pension
board, however, refused to recognize the collateral estoppel effect of the
IAC's finding and rejected her application. The widow then sought
and was granted mandamus to compel the city and its board to grant
the pension.
The IAC's award was final and the issue it determined-whether
French's death was precipitated by performance of his duties-was the
precise question which the pension board was compelled to resolve in
granting or denying the pension. The supreme court, therefore, was required to determine only "[w]hether the decision of the Industrial Acci'43
dent Commission is res judicata and binding upon the pension board.
4
4
The answer was affirmative.
Concerning identity of parties, the court held:
It is immaterial that the pension board was not a party to the
Industrial Accident Commission proceeding. The city, which is
not only a party herein but the real party in interest, was also a
party to and appeared in the prior proceeding. Under the city
charter, the pension board acts as an agent of the city, and, in
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

63 Cal. App. 2d at 446, 147 P.2d at 94.
Id.
40 Cal. 2d 477, 254 P.2d 26 (1953).
Id. at 479, 254 P.2d at 27.
Id. at 479 n.1, 254 P.2d at 27 n.1.
Id. at 479, 254 P.2d at 27.
Id. at 482, 254 P.2d at 29.
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this representative capacity,
45 it is bound by the commission's decision if the city is bound.
Whether the pension board exercised quasi-judicial powers or was a
mere administrative agent, performing ministerial tasks, was not important. "In either case, the doctrine of res judicata [collateral estoppel] is applicable. ... "I'
Furthermore, collateral estoppel was not rendered inapplicable by
the fact that the two tribunals employed different rules of procedure
and evidence. 7
[A] difference in burden of proof does not justify any exception to
the general rule of res judicata . . . . "All that is essential . . .
is that a party should have been given one opportunity for the
judicial determination of an issue by a tribunal having the requisite
authority
and proceeding in a manner recognized as due process of
48
law.",
The court denied that, in disapproving Schmidt, it stripped the
pension board of requisite powers by allowing the judgment of another
tribunal to supersede that of the board. There was no divesting of
authority
except the power to make an independent finding on an issue of
fact previously determined by another tribunal. This limitation is,
of course, inherent in the doctrine
and is a necessary result in every
49
case in which it is applied.
French v. Rishell appears to be the definitive statement of California law on the application of collateral estoppel to situations in which an
employee may be entitled to overlapping benefits under workmen's
compensation and a county or municipal pension plan. 50 It is cited
with approval, and its authority has not been openly challenged in the
45.

Id.

46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 481, 254 P.2d at 28.

In the IAC proceeding, the widow's burden of

proof was considerably less than that required by the pension board.

In workmen's

compensation cases, a presumption arises under CAL. LABOR CODE § 3212 that a heart
condition sustained by a public employee arose out of and in the course of his employment. No such presumption is available to municipal pension boards. 40 Cal. 2d at 480,
254 P.2d at 28.
49.

40 Cal. 2d at 481, 254 P.2d at 29.

50.

In response to the trial court's decision in French v. Rishell, section 249(3)

of the Oakland City Charter was amended in 1951. The new provision states that
"[n]o benefits shall be paid under this Article [covering the Police and Fire Retirement

System] on the basis of an award by the Industrial Accident Commission of the State
of California." Since the amendment was enacted, no case comparable to French has
been adjudicated in which the provision was involved. The only case citing the amendment is City of Oakland v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 259 Cal. App. 2d 163, 170,
66 Cal. Rptr. 283, 288 (1968).
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appellate courts.r1
With the basic doctrine of collateral estoppel established, it is instructive to examine how subsequent cases have treated various aspects
of the doctrine.
Identity of Issues-Finality of Judgment
To reiterate,
three criteria must be satisfied if collateral estoppel is
52
to be invoked:
(1) Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical
with the one presented in the action in question?
(2) Was there a final judgment on the merits?
(3) Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or
in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?
DeCelle v. City of Alameda53 dealt with the first two criteria at
length. As a fireman, DeCelle was covered both by workmen's compensation and a municipal retirement and disability pension.5" In 1955,
he suffered aggravation of a duodenal ulcer and was retired. He petitioned the pension board for a disability pension, but by mutual agreement consideration was postponed until his pending workmen's compensation claim was adjudicated. Almost 10 months later, the Industrial Accident Commission found that: (a) DeCelle had received an
injury, i.e., aggravation of the ulcer; (b) the injury "was caused by and
arose out of his employment"; and (c) because of this injury, he was
"permanently disabled from performing his duties as a member of said
Fire Department . . ."I' After the city petitioned for reconsideration, the IAC rescinded its former findings and issued new findings and
an award. The finding that "by reason of [his] injury, [DeCelle] was
permanently disabled from performing his duties as a member of said
Fire Department" was stricken.5 6
Finally, in 1958, the pension board denied DeCelle a pension on
51. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 67 Cal. 2d 483,
432 P.2d 365, 62 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1967). There will be discussion later concerning
possible erosion of French's authority by Grant v. Board of Retirement, 253 Cal. App.
2d 1020, 61 Cal. Rptr. 791 (1967), and Petry v. Board of Retirement, 273 A.C.A.
140, 77 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1969), in text accompanying notes 95-104 infra.
52. See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
53. 186 Cal. App. 2d 574, 9 Cal. Rptr. 549 (1960).
54. The relevant ordinance provides in part: "Should any member become
physically disabled by reason of any injury received in or illness caused by or arising
out of the performance of duty, the Board shall, upon the written request of said member, or his guardian, or without such request if it deems it for the good of the service,
order that such member be retired from active service," quoted in 186 Cal. App. 2d at

581, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 554 (1960) (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 578, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 551.

56. Id. at 577, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 551.
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the ground that he had not been "physically disabled by reason of an
illness or injury caused by or arising out of the performance of his
duties . . . ."" The board rejected DeCelle's contention that the
IAC's findings, including the stricken finding noted above, were binding on the board by collateral estoppel.
DeCelle successfully sought a writ of mandamus from the superior
court to require the pension board to grant him an award, but the court
of appeal reversed. The court quickly dispensed with DeCelle's argument that the stricken finding of the IAC was binding on the pension
board. In the alternative, DeCelle argued that the IAC's award of a
55 percent permanent disability necessarily must have required a find
ing that DeCelle's ulcer had necessitated his retirement. The court,
however, stated that there were many factors that went into an award of
permanent disability by the IAC and that therefore "it cannot be said in
lieu of a finding thereon that the commission based its award to [De
Celle] on a determination that he could no longer pursue his former
'
occupation."58
Moreover, the court agreed with the pension board that a distinction
"must be drawn between the meaning of the words 'physically disabled'
in the [pension] ordinance and the words 'permanent disability' as
used in the workmen's compensation statutes and by the commission in
its decision." 59 "Physical disability" means disabled from returning to
his previous employment, whereas "permanent disability" means any
lasting and irreversible impairment, such as the loss of a toe or finger.
Such impairment may or may not produce a loss of ability to work at
the employee's former job. 60 Under this construction of the two statutes, held the court,
the board . . . was required to determine not only whether
[DeCelle] had incurred the injury in the performance of duty,
but also whether said injury had rendered him incapable of continuing his former employment. . . . [T]he commission's decision only determined the first of these two issues. 61
Since the second issue before the board had not been adjudicated by
the IAC, collateral estoppel could not apply.
Collateral estoppel was held inapplicable to the situation in DeCelle
for the additional reason that the IAC's award was not a final judgment.
The court held that the "commission had continuing jurisdiction for
five years from the date of [DeCelle's] injury, or until . . . 1960, to
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 580-81, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
59. Id. at 581, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
60. Id. at 582, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 554-55.
61. Id., 9 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
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rescind, alter or amend its prior orders. 62 During those five years, IAC
orders were not final and could not be res judicata as to other tribunals.
Therefore, the pension board was free to make an independent evaluation of DeCelle's application in 1958.63
DeCelle quite correctly recognized that, under some circumstances,
the IAC's jurisdiction continues for five years after the date of the injury. 4 Despite DeCelle's unequivocal holding that a workmen's compensation award is not final for the purposes of collateral estoppel until
five years after the injury-a holding that has been cited with approval
and followed by other courts of appeal6 5 -the case would appear to have
been overruled by the recent supreme court decision in Dow Chemical
Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board.66 In that case, it was
held that the WCAB must give res judicata and collateral estoppel effect
to its final decisions. 67 The supreme court apparently considered the
time when a WCAB decision becomes final for the purposes of collateral
estoppel to be well-settled law. It devoted just two sentences to a discussion of this point: "None of the parties to the cases . . . requested
reconsideration
by the WCAB. As a result, these awards became
final." 8
This view has been reaffirmed in the recent court of appeal case
of Marsh v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board.69 In deciding
whether the WCAB had to give res judicata effect to its prior decision
in the case, the court of appeal expressly stated that "[a] decision of
the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board becomes final upon the
expiration of the time for review." 70 WCAB decisions since Dow Chemical have been in harmony with this view. 1
Although Dow Chemical concerned the application of collateral estoppel in subsequent WCAB proceedings, the decision would seem to
apply with equal force to fact situations like DeCelle involving pension
boards. If so, then the holding on finality in DeCelle is no longer the
62. Id. at 578-79, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 552-53.
63. Id. at 579-80, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
64. CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 5803-05. Section 5410 establishes yet another ground
for five years of continuing jurisdiction.
65. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 226 Cal. App. 2d 748, 757,
38 Cal. Rptr. 364, 370 (1964); Solari v. Atlas-Universal Serv., Inc., 215 Cal. App. 2d
587, 594, 599, 30 Cal. Rptr. 407, 411, 414 (1963).
66. 67 Cal. 2d 483, 432 P.2d 365, 62 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1967).
67. Id. at 491, 432 P.2d at 370, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 762.
68. Id. at 488, 432 P.2d at 369, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 761 (emphasis added).
69. 257 Cal. App. 2d 574, 65 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1968).
70. Id. at 580, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
71. E.g., Burris v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 33 Cal. Comp. Cases 419 (1968);
Big Ben Sash & Door Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 33 Cal. Comp. Cases 33

(1968).
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72

Identity of Parties
If collateral estoppel is to be invoked, not only must there be a
prior, final adjudication of the precise issue in question; the party against
whom the plea is asserted must have been a party, or in privity with a
party, in the prior proceeding.
In determining identity of parties, close attention must be directed
to any agency relationship existing between the county or municipality
and the pension board in question. In French v. Rishell,78 a municipal
pension board was bound by a prior award by the IAC although
technically it had not been a party to the proceeding. The board's
absence was not important since it acted as an agent of the city of
Oakland, which had been a party. 74 Moreover, it was immaterial
whether the pension board was regarded
as a mere agent without authority to make any determinations of
fact or as a local administrative body with power to make final
determinations of fact. In either case, the doctrine of res judicata
is applicable .... 75
With the proliferation of municipal and county bodies-and their
concomitant pension funds-privity may be quite difficult to establish.
Flaherty v. Board of Retirement7 6 illustrates the situation clearly.
Flaherty was employed by the East Los Angeles Fire Protection District. Although the District is governed by the county board of supervisors acting ex officio, it is "not a department or agency of the County
of Los Angeles but is a separate entity formed under state law. '77
Disability pensions, are not administered by either the district or the
county, 78 but by the Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Association, "an organization distinct from either the County of Los Angeles
79
or the

.

.

. District.

As a fireman, Flaherty was "required" to engage in physical activities while on duty, including frequent games of volleyball. During
one game, he badly injured a knee. The retirement association denied
72. For an excellent criticism of the position on finality subsequently adopted in
Dow Chemical, see Solari v. Atlas-Universal Serv., Inc., 215 Cal. App. 2d 587, 594-99,
30 Cal. Rptr. 407, 411-14 (1963).
73. 40 Cal. 2d 477, 254 P.2d 26 (1953).
74. Id. at 482, 254 P.2d at 29.
75. Id.
76. 198 Cal. App. 2d 397, 18 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1961).
77. Id. at 402, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 260. Under CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 14451, district employees are not ipso facto employees of the county.
78. Enabling legislation is the County Employees Retirement Law of 1937, CAL.
GOV'T CODE §§ 31450-898.
79. 198 Cal. App. 2d at 404, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
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his petition for a service-connected disability pension although the denial was without prejudice and, hence, not final. Upon petition for
reconsideration, the association again denied the pension without prejudice. A year later, the IAC found that the injuries were serviceincurred permanent disabilities and granted an award. Flaherty petitioned the association for reconsideration of his pension, contending
that the IAC's finding was binding on the association by operation of
collateral estoppel; but again, the petition was denied without prejudice.
Flaherty then sought mandamus to compel payment of the pension. In denying relief, the court held that the IAC's findings could

not work a collateral estoppel. Only the fire district had been a party
to the proceedings and no agency relationship was found between the

district and the retirement association. Since the party against whom
collateral estoppel was asserted was not linked to the 1AC's proceedings
by privity, the plea failed. 80
Recent Developments

If a local pension board retires an employee after finding that he
sustained a service-connected disability, can a subsequent WCAB finding that the disability was not service-connected be pleaded as collateral
estoppel, if the pension board later reviews the award during the exercise of its continuing jurisdiction?"
This question was posed in Pathe

v. City of Bakersfield. 2

Until 1960, when he developed a heart condition, Pathe was a
Bakersfield fireman. Although he promptly applied to the 1AC for com-

pensation benefits, no action was taken for nearly a year and a half. In
the meantime, the board of trustees of the firemen's pension fund, acting
on its own initiative, retired Pathe and awarded him a service-con-

nected disability pension." A month later, the IAC finally announced4
its finding that Pathe's heart condition did not arise out of his work .
80. Id. at 402-06, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 260-63. Because there was no identity of
parties, the court found it unnecessary to discuss whether the IAC's award was a final
judgment. Id. at 406 n.6, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 262 n.6.
81. For a typical provision concerning the exercise of continuing jurisdiction by a
pension board, see text accompanying note 86 infra.
82. 255 Cal. App. 2d 409, 63 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1967).
83. Section 168(4) of the city charter authorizes the board to retire a disabled
employee on its own motion: "Whenever any member of the Fire Department shall become disabled by reason of sickness caused by the discharge of the duties of such
member in such Department and such disability shall continue for one (1) year or
shall become so physically or mentally disabled as a result of such injuries or sickness
as to render his retirement from active service necessary, the Pension Board shall order
and direct that such member be retired," quoted in 255 Cal. App. 2d at 422, 63
Cal. Rptr. at 228.
84. The award was denied despite the presumption arising under CAL. LABOR
CODE § 3212 that any heart condition developed by a fireman arises out of his work.
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Pathe received his service-connected pension for nearly two years but
in early 1963, an actuary for the pension fund chanced upon the IAC's
adverse report and, upon advice of the city attorney, the pension board
modified its former decision. Pathe's pension lost its service-connected
status and his benefits were reduced from $270.45 per month to
$135.22. In 1966, Pathe sought mandamus to compel restoration of
his former pension. Mandamus was granted by the superior court
and, upon appeal, was affirmed by a 3-2 decision.85
After the pension board had retired Pathe, it retained continuing
jurisdiction by virtue of section 168(4) of the city charter, which provided that
any such retirement allowance shall cease when the member's
disability ceases and, in such event, such member shall be restored
to the same rank or position which he held at the time of retirement. 86
Counsel for the board argued that modification of Pathe's pension in
1963 constituted a subsequent civil action to which collateral estoppel
was applicable.8 7 Therefore, regardless of its former action, the pension
board was bound by the IAC's prior finding that Pathe's heart condition was not service-connected. 88
The court found that this contention was "entirely without merit."8 9
The pension board's continuing jurisdiction was confined to terminating
pensions "when the member's disability ceases";9° it did not empower
the board to reconsider whether the disability which originally prompted
retirement of an employee was service-incurred. If the pension board
were compelled to honor the IAC's findings under collateral estoppel
while exercising its continuing jurisdiction, collateral estoppel would,
in effect, apply retrospectively.9 This would be a contradiction in
terms; collateral estoppel, by definition, is restricted to issues "previously
determined by another tribunal. '9 2 Not only would this violate the
doctrine's very essence, it could perpetrate gross injustice. If "a decision of the retirement board to retire an employee on a serviceconnected pension" were subject to reversal at some future date, the
possibility of reduced payments and potential refunds "could create an
undue burden on an employee who retired under compulsion without
85. 255 Cal. App. 2d 409, 412, 421, 63 Cal. Rptr. 220, 221, 227 (1967).
86. Id. at 422, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
87. Brief for Appellant at 9, Pathe v. City of Bakersfield, 255 Cal. App. 2d
409, 63 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1967).
88. Id. at 27-29.
89. 255 Cal. App. 2d at 417, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
90. Id. at 422, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 228 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 417, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
92. French v. Rishell, 40 Cal. 2d 477, 481, 254 P.2d 26, 29 (1953) (emphasis
added).
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93
appealing or challenging the retirement board's decision."

A Retreat from French v. Rishell?
Until 1967, application of the collateral estoppel doctrine appeared
to conform to the criteria described previously, but between 1967 and
1969, two appellate court cases were decided which may alter the situation significantly. 4 Each dealt with fact situations similar to those in
Flaherty.
In Grant v. Board of Retirement 5 the plaintiff was the Kern
County building inspector. Disability pensions for county employees
were administered by the Kern County Employees Retirement Association, a body which appeared comparable to the retirement association discussed in Flaherty.6 Grant suffered two heart attacks, which
the TAC found to be service-connected. The retirement association disregarded this holding and refused to grant a service-connected disability pension. In denying mandamus to enforce payment of the pension,
the court of appeal, citing Flaherty,held:
At the outset, it should be noted that the Industrial Accident
Commission,. . . previously made an award at complete variance
with the finding of the . . . Board of Retirement. Such a determination by the Industrial Accident Commission is not, however,
binding upon the retirement board, or, in other words, it is not res
adjudicata as to the question of whether the present disability of
the petitioner was caused as a result of, or in the course of his
employment by the County of Kern. The retirement board had
valid, independent rights with respect to determining whether the
petitioner suffered injury in the course and within the scope of
his employment. .... 97
Quite possibly, the court meant to do no more than affirm the holding in Flaherty concerning identity of parties. 98 If so, the court did
not mention the issue directly, much less emphasize it. Instead, it spoke
of the board's "valid, independent rights," which might imply that de93. 255 Cal. App. 2d at 417, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
94. See note 51 supra.
95. 253 Cal. App. 2d 1020, 61 Cal. Rptr. 791 (1967).
96. Compare id. at 1023, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 793, with Flaherty v. Board of Retirement, 198 Cal. App. 2d 397, 402, 18 Cal. Rptr. 256, 260 (1961). In Flaherty, the
enabling legislation was CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 31450-898.
97. 253 Cal. App. 2d at 1021, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 791-792 (1967) (emphasis
added).
98. Judge Conley wrote the opinion in Grant. Two months later, he registered a vigorous dissent in Pathe v. Bakersfield, discussed in text accompanying notes
82-131 infra, in which he contended that a decision of the IAC should have been given
collateral estoppel effect by a municipal pension board. " 255 Cal. App. 2d 409, 424425, 63 Cal. Rptr. 220, 229 (1967). This tends to weaken the inference that a county
pension board is wholly and forever free from such collateral estoppel.
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terminations of fact by the IAC are not binding on the board, even if
all requirements for collateral estoppel have been met.
This implication is strengthened if Grant is studied in conjunction
with Petry v. Board of Retirement.9 Petry, a deputy sheriff for Los
Angeles County, was injured in a training exercise in 1961 and was
able to work only sporadically thereafter. In 1965, the IAC found that
Petry's disability was permanent and service-incurred. 00 Later the Los
Angeles County Employees Retirement Association, the same body
involved in Flaherty, disregarded the IAC's findings and denied Petry
a service-connected pension.
Petry's petition for mandamus was denied. The court stated:
The Retirement Board is a quasi-judicial body. In reviewing the
evidence presented to the Board, neither the superior court nor
this court on appeal may weigh the evidence. . . . [All] "conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of that decision
and all legitimate and reasonable inferences must be indulged in
its support."'""
Moreover, assertion of collateral estoppel was without merit: 02
In any event, it is settled that "a determination by the Industrial
Accident Commission is not, however, binding upon the retirement
board . . . . The retirement board had valid, independent rights
with respect to determining whether petitioner suffered injury in the
course and within the scope of his employment. .... ,.13
Petry, like Grant, could have reached its decision on the basis of
the reasoning in Flaherty that there was no identity of parties. Neither
did so expressly. Taken together, their references to "valid, independent rights" and the court's incapacity to evaluate evidence which
was before the retirement board is strongly reminiscent of the long-discredited Schmidt v. Pension Board. Schmidt also justified exemption of
a pension board from collateral estoppel on the ground that "an appellate court has no power to set aside findings of a judicial body vested
with fact finding power when such findings are based on conflicting
evidence."'0 4 Since Schmidt was expressly overruled by French v. Rishell, Grand and Petry may well portend erosion of French's authority.
The merit of such a development is dubious, however. If county
and municipal pension boards were exempted from the doctrine of
99. 273 A.C.A. 140, 77 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1969).
100. Id. at 142, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 892.
101. Id. at 143, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 892-93, quoting Marcucci v. Board of Equalization, 138 Cal. App. 2d 605, 608, 292 P.2d 264, 266 (1956).
102. Petry conceded this to the trial court. 273 A.C.A. at 144, 77 Cal. Rptr.
at 893.
103. Id. at 144-45, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 894, quoting Grant v. Board of Retirement,
253 Cal. App. 2d 1020, 1021, 61 Cal. Rptr. 71, 71-72 (1967). Flaherty was also cited.
104. 63 Cal. App. 2d 439, 446, 147 P.2d 90, 94 (1944).
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collateral estoppel despite their quasi-judicial status, they would possess
autonomy which is denied even to the courts.
Pension Board Findings Cannot Be Invoked As Collateral
Estoppel in Workmen's Compensation Proceedings
Since a pension board with factfinding powers is a quasi-judicial
body, its final determinations of fact have been held binding upon the
courts. 1 r Pension board decisions, however, have never been accorded
res judicata status in workmen's compensation proceedings. This result
seems strongly discouraged, if not precluded outright, by the constitution, the Labor Code, and local charters or ordinances.
Article 20, section 21 of the California Constitution specifies that
the workmen's compensation apparatus to be established by statute shall
accomplish "substantial justice in all cases. . . without incumbrance of
any character."'10 6 The Labor Code conferred exclusive jurisdiction
upon the IAC for adjudication of "the recovery of compensation, or concerning any right or liability arising out of or incidental thereto."'0 7
Moreover, it is not uncommon for the charters and ordinances creating pension funds to so delimit their08jurisdiction that it in no way
interferes with deliberations of the IAC.1

Conclusion
Grant and Petry notwithstanding,' 0 9 French v. Rishell still appears
to be California's most definitive statement of the collateral estoppel
effect that WCAB decisions have upon the deliberations of county and
municipal pension boards. If the criteria in Bernhard v. Bank of America are satisfied, a prior decision of the WCAB is binding upon a pension board by collateral estoppel. Conversely, no case has seriously suggested that a prior pension board decision can be pleaded as collateral
estoppel against the WCAB.
Although the doctrine of collateral estoppel has been clearly
defined, its application may be quite difficult in practice. Of the six
cases reaching the appellate courts in recent years in which the issue
105. See cases cited note 14 supra.
106. Emphasis added.
107. CAL. LABoR CODE § 5300.
108. Illustrative of such draftsmanship is section 179(5) of the Bakersfield city
charter which, in dealing with the Firemen's Pension Fund, states: "The provisions of
the foregoing sections shall in no way alter, modify, change, or abrogate any of the
terms, conditions, or provisions of that certain act of the legislature known and referred to as the Workmen's Compensation, Insurance and Safety Act or any amendments thereto," quoted in Pathe v. City of Bakersfield, 255 Cal. App. 2d 409, 416,
63 Cal. Rptr. 220, 223 (1967).

109. See text accompanying notes 95-104 supra.
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was whether WCAB decisions worked a collateral estoppel on local
pension boards, 1 0 only one actually found that all of the requisite conditions for invoking the doctrine were present."' This does not necessarily indicate that courts are reluctant to apply the doctrine; the facts
in each particular case substantiated the court's holding. Nor is it in
any way definitive of the manner in which local boards employ collateral
estoppel in the overwhelming majority of cases that never reach the
appellate courts. What seems abundantly clear is that if an injured
employee seeks to employ collateral estoppel, he must satisfy the criteria
of Bernhardv. Bank of America meticulously.
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